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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to develop a general equilibrium model with
money and trade taking place at disequilibrium prices. There are multiple markets
being visited sequentially and transactions occur along the adjustment path. This
implies quantity rationing to clear the market and we assume that there are
cash-in-advance constraints on the transactions. The updating of the prices and
cash balances along the way makes it necessary for agents to reconsider their
trading plans subject to new information due to substitution and spill-over eﬀects.
The dynamics of this disequilibrium re-optimization process are shown to depend
crucially on the exchange mechanisms that are imposed. One of the results is that
the introduction of a cash-in-advance constraint does not help in stabilizing the
ﬂuctuations of cash balances, even though it does prevent debts from occurring
outside of equilibrium.
Keywords: Monetary dynamics, Sequential markets, Moving-horizon
optimization, Financial constraints.
JEL: C61, D51, D60, E31.
1 Introduction
An important but still largely unresolved problem in economic theory is the question of
stability and the convergence towards equilibrium. It is often assumed that equilibrium
prices are generated by a market mechanism that is driven by the law of supply and
demand, a model described by the Walrasian taˆtonnement process, in which a central
price setting mechanism, or market maker, adjusts prices on all markets simultaneously
based on the demand and supply of all the market participants. It is essentially a nonlin-
ear dynamical system that is driven by a central processing unit, which coordinates the
decentralized decisions of self-interested, autonomously acting agents.
It is well-known in the literature on (price) adjustment processes that the Walrasian
taˆtonnement process need not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium. Some examples in
which cycles or chaotic behavior are shown to occur are in Scarf (1960), Saari (1985), Go-
eree, Hommes and Weddepohl (1997) and Tuinstra (2000). In dynamic price adjustment
processes it is not uncommon to use as the dynamic process a sequence of temporary
equilibria. An equilibrium is simply obtained in every period of the process by solving
a market-clearing equation. But the question of how these temporary equilibria can be
reached as the result of some dynamic disequilibrium process is then usually left un-
speciﬁed. The simplest model in which such a process can be studied is in an exchange
economy without a production sector or a ﬁnancial sector. This model should be seen as
a pedagogical device: it is a ﬁrst step towards a more comprehensive theory that explains
how equilibria can be reached. The question is also strongly related to the stability of
Keynesian or underemployment equilibria under dynamic adjustment processes that take
place outside of equilibrium. This refers back to the Austrian tradition of disequilibrium
modelling (e.g. Hayek (1928), Lindahl (1939b) and Hicks (1939)); for a general survey
see Zappia (1999).
In this paper we develop a dynamic model with trade outside of equilibrium in a
monetary exchange economy with cash-in-advance constraints. The markets are visited
sequentially and the transactions are taking place at disequilibrium prices. A direct
motivation for such a sequential model is that not all markets may be open simultaneously,
and that the information ﬂow between the markets is sequential.
The model with sequential market visits is related to the Dual-Decisions Hypothesis
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of Clower (1965), which states that the decisions for multiple markets have to be taken
sequentially by taking into account the trades that have already occurred during previous
market visits. This forces the agents to reconsider their trading plans subject to new
information due to spill-overs. An interpretation of the Dual Decisions Hypothesis (due to
Benassy, 1975) is that the markets can be seen as ‘trading posts’, with a single commodity
being traded at each post. The trading posts are visited sequentially according to a
predetermined market order.1
The trading period is divided into subperiods, or ‘market days’. On each market day
only one trading post (market) is visited so only one good can be traded. The markets
are visited in sequence and prices adjust sequentially. There is trade at disequilibrium
prices, markets clear by quantity rationing and monetary and spill-over eﬀects play a
role outside of equilibrium. During the market visits the quantities are traded against
prevailing market prices, which have been predetermined during the previous round of
trading. In this sense the model belongs to the class of ﬁx-price models (Hicks, 1939).
After every round of trades a new trading round begins and the sequence of market visits
is indeﬁnitely repeated, see Figure 4.
Prices are temporarily ﬁxed and taken as given, but can adjust after a market has
been visited. Only the price for the commodity that is traded on the current market is
updated, since the other markets are temporarily closed for trading. After every round of
market visits other economic variables than the prices can be updated such as the budget
constraints and the expectations of the agents.
According to Magill and Quinzii (1996, Ch.7) a satisfactory modelling of money re-
quires an open-ended future. Trade should take place in a sequence economy in which the
imperfections in the trading opportunities of the agents play a role (Ibid. p. 488). The
trading possibilities of the agents can be restricted due to multiple transaction constraints,
including income, ﬁnancial or quantity constraints. Such restrictions have consequences
in monetary and in real terms. Not only are there spill-over and substitution eﬀects due
to trade at disequilibrium prices, but there are also wealth eﬀects due to the monetary
restrictions, i.e. there are cash-in-advance or liquidity eﬀects.
The current model with sequential trade is a generalization of the model in Weddepohl
1The market order is the same for all agents. A preferred model would be one in which the market
order is heterogeneous and subject to choice by the agents themselves.
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(1996). For disequilibrium trade to be possible an endogenous quantity rationing mech-
anism is needed to clear the market, otherwise no transactions can occur. To determine
transactions we use a proportional rationing rule: agents on the long side of the market
are rationed in proportion to their own demand or supply orders. If the agents know
that the rationing is proportional then the rule can be manipulated by over-asking or
over-supplying the market. For simplicity we will assume that agents ignore this type of
strategic behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the formal structure of the
model is introduced. Section 3 contains a numerical example and provides simulation
results and section 4 concludes.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2 The structure of the model
This section describes the physical characteristics of the economy, the monetary insti-
tutions, the timing of the model, the cash-in-advance equilibrium, the agents’ decision-
making problem, the budget accounting mechanism, the proportional rationing mech-
anism and the price dynamics. All these model ingredients provide the model with a
modular structure in which the outputs of one module are the inputs for the next. This
facilitates operationalizing the formal model into a computational model.
2.1 The exchange economy
We consider an exchange economy that remains the same over time, i.e. it is a stationary
economy without growth. We further assume that agents are inﬁnitely lived and that
endowments are the same in every period. There is no storage facility and the commodities
are perishable, that is they have to be traded or consumed during the current period. It
is further assumed that there are N households and L markets. Households are indexed
by h ∈ N = {1, ..., N} and commodities are indexed by k ∈M = {1, ...,m}. A household
h ∈ N has a consumption set Xh = RL+, a utility function Uh deﬁned on Xh, and a vector
of initial endowments wh = (wh1 , ..., w
h
m) ∈ RL++. Finally, there is a positive money stock
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M¯ ≥ 0, which is distributed across the households according to the cash distribution
{M1, ...,MN}, with ∑hMh = M¯ .
2.2 Monetary institutions
The trade deﬁcits and trade surpluses that accumulate during a trading round have to
be corrected on the balance of account of the agents. This will aﬀect the agents’ budget
constraints. Agents must not only repay the old debts that have already accumulated but
must also prevent new debts from occurring. If these eﬀects were ignored then it would
be optimal for agents to run into debt indeﬁnitely. For this we require the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 All agents have a bank account and a credit card (or debit card) to per-
form transactions. Bank accounts are a temporary store of purchasing power between the
sale and purchase of commodities.
Assumption 2 There is a positive money stock and all transactions are paid by cash
transfers between one agents’ bank account (the debtor) to another agents’ bank account
(the creditor). The bank accounts thus serve as the medium of exchange.
In addition to the budget constraint there is a cash-in-advance constraint which only
becomes binding on the market when the agent tries to spent more then the bank account
allows. Trade deﬁcits are therefore excluded, all bank saldi are non-negative. If an agent
has a trade surplus at the end of a period, then this surplus can be carried over to the next
period and can be spent on consumption. The cash-in-advance constraint causes agents
to become rationed in their demand, implying that convergence towards equilibrium (if
it occurs) takes place without the occurrence of any debts.
2.3 Timing
Time is discrete and every period is divided into subperiods. The time-index for a sub-
period is (t, k), where t is the current period and k is the current subperiod in period
t. Commodity k can be traded in subperiod (t, k) and will also be traded in all sub-
periods (t + n, k), for all n ≥ 0. The number of subperiods in every trading round
is equal to the number of markets m. In every subperiod only one commodity can be
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traded in exchange for money. To be sure, the sequence of time periods is as follows:
(..., (t, 1), ..., (t,m), (t + 1, 1), ..., (t + 1,m), ...). The subperiods should be seen as the
unit-period, which is the smallest unit of time on which decisions are made, and can be
interpreted as ‘market days’ (as in Lindahl 1939) since only one market is visited in every
subperiod. A trading round consists of a sequence of such ‘market days’ and can be called
a ‘trading week’ (as in Hicks 1939). But this interpretation should not be taken literally,
since the period can have any arbitrary calendar length.
2.4 The state variables
The state vector s ∈ S is a multidimensional vector that represents the state of the
economy. It pertains to the state of the markets and to the internal states of the individual
agents. For each agent we record a history of past revenues and past money balances,
with a time lag of one period given the transactions of the previous round. All the state
variables are given in Table 1. A state s ∈ S is a tuple given by({pk, Dk, Sk}k∈M, {zhk , zˆhk , z¯hk , Rhk ,Mhk , µh}h∈N,k∈M) ∈ S, where
S = (RL++ × RL+ × RL+)× (RN×L × RN×L × RN×L × RN×L × RN×L+ × RN+ ).
It should be understood that the planned trade vectors (zhk ) and the realized transactions
(z¯hk ) of each individual agent are unobservable to any of the other agents; these are private
information. The total demand and supply on the market cannot be publicly observed,
but there is a centralized mechanism per market which is assumed to aggregate all the
buy and sell orders. The price vector is known to all agents; this is public information.
We assume that new prices are announced at the moment that they are updated, which
is after the transactions on a market have occurred, but before the next market is opened
for trade. So the updated price for market k is known prior to visiting market k + 1. At
every moment, the full price-vector is known one full round ahead (there is a public price
list with ﬁxed prevailing market prices). The only uncertainty in the model is therefore
the quantities that will be traded, since agents cannot observe the planned transactions
(the notional demands) of the other market participants.
Now that we have ﬁxed the notation for all the state variables, and described the
physical characteristics of the exchange economy, we will formulate the decision making
process in the next section.
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Table 1: State variables.
Variable
p = (p1, ..., pm) prices
wh = (wh1 , ..., w
h
m) initial endowments of agent h
zh = (zh1 , ..., z
h
m) planned trades of agent h (notional excess demand)
zˆhk buy or sell signal after applying a cash-in-advance constraint
z¯hk realized trade of agent h (rationed demands, or transactions)
shk = min{0, zhk} ≤ 0 planned supply of agent h (sell order)
dhk = max{0, zhk} ≥ 0 planned demand of agent h (buy order)
Sk = −
∑
h s
h
k ≥ 0 market supply on market k
Dk =
∑
h d
h
k ≥ 0 market demand on market k
s¯hk = min{0, z¯hk} ≤ 0 realized supply of agent h
d¯hk = max{0, z¯hk} ≥ 0 realized demand of agent h
Rhk = −pkzhk net revenues of agent h on market k
Mhk ≥ 0 realized cash balance of agent h
µhk ≥ 0 minimum cash position of agent h over previous trading round
pwh + µhk corrected budget constraint of agent h
Notional demand
The notional demand xh ∈ RL+ is the best choice from the budget set Bh, which depends
on prices and the real wealth pwh + M˜h, consisting of the value of possessions and real
balances:2
B
h(p,pwh + M˜h) = {x ∈ RL|pxh ≤ pwh + M˜h, xhk ≥ 0,∀k ∈M}. (1)
The notional demand function Dh : RL++ × R → RL+ is deﬁned by:
Dh(p,pwh + M˜h) = argmax
x
{Uh(xh)|xh ∈ Bh(p,pwh + M˜h)}. (2)
The notional excess demand function zh : RL++ × R → RL is:
zh(p, M˜h) = Dh(p,pwh + M˜h)−wh. (3)
2We include unanticipated debts and claims M˜h in addition to the income from resources: pwh+M˜h,
such that
∑
h M˜
h = 0. For now we assume that M˜h = 0 for all h = 1, ..., N , but in later sections the
value of M˜h will ﬂuctuate and can take on positive values.
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The aggregate excess demand is a function of the price system p and the income distri-
bution (pw1 + M˜1, ...,pwN + M˜N), where
∑
h M˜
h = 0:
Z(p, M˜1, ..., M˜N ) =
∑
h∈N
Dh(p,pwh + M˜h)−
∑
h∈N
wh. (4)
In an equilibrium there are no unanticipated debts or claims: M˜h = 0,Dh(p,pwh+M˜h) =
Dh(p,pwh), zh(p, M˜h) = zh(p, 0), and Z(p, M˜1, ..., M˜N ) = Z(p, 0, ..., 0).
Definition 1 (Walrasian equilibrium) A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) consists of a price
system p ∈ RL++, a feasible allocation xh ∈ Xh for all h ∈ N and an income distribution
(pw1, ...,pwN ) such that:
1. xh = Dh(p,pwh) (optimality)
2. Z(p, 0, ..., 0) = 0 (market clearing)
2.5 The cash-in-advance constraint
Suppose that agents are not permitted (or do not want) to have a debt during the trade
sequence and do not want to hold more money than is strictly necessary to perform
transactions. An equilibrium must then satisfy the additional condition that agents’
money holdings do not become negative along the sequence. In other words, their trade
balance should always remain positive (or non-negative). This requires a positive money
stock, which can now be called ‘cash’, and it deﬁnes a ‘cash-in-advance equilibrium’ (cf.
Clower, 1967). The minimum amount of cash an agent needs in order to prevent a trade
deﬁcit is exactly equal to the largest trade deﬁcit that would occur along the sequence of
trades if all transactions would take place in terms of credit transfers between buyers and
sellers.
In addition to the budget constraint we now introduce a cash-in-advance constraint,
which becomes binding only if the planned consumption at subperiod (t, k) violates the
cash position:
pk(t, k)z
h
k (t, k) ≤Mh(t, k). (5)
This constraint is equivalent to setting the planned trade equal to the minimum
zˆhk (t, k) = min{zhk (t, k),Mh(t, k)/pk(t, k)}. (6)
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The cash-in-advance constraint implies that if the money holdings available to agent h
at the beginning of subperiod (t, k) suﬃces only to buy the quantity Mh(t, k)/pk(t, k),
instead of the optimal amount zhk (t, k), then the minimum amount will be ordered. If
however the cash balance is suﬃcient to buy the optimal quantity – the planned trade
is not too expensive – then that amount will be ordered. Note that a cash-in-advance
constraint strictly prohibits the occurrence of debts because the cash balance cannot
become negative.
In fact the cash-in-advance constraint in combination with the budget constraint en-
sures that the agents are not running a deﬁcit nor are accumulating a surplus. This gives
the monetary dynamics the tendency to converge towards an equilibrium. If prices are
too low (high) with respect to the equilibrium levels, then there is an excess demand
(supply) for all commodities, because the purchasing power of the money balances is too
high (low). The general price level will increase (decrease) as all prices adjust to the total
money stock M¯ in the economy.
Cash-in-advance equilibrium
In general, the sequence of equilibrium transactions produces a sequence of net revenues
for each agent h = 1, ..., N :
Rhk = −pk(t, k)zhk (t, k), k = 1, ...,m (7)
where Rhk > 0 means the proceeds from sales on market k and R
h
k < 0 is an expenditure
on market k. A trade deﬁcit or surplus at subperiod (t, k) is then the sum of net revenues∑k
j=1 R
h
j . The largest trade deﬁcit that would occur if a negative trade balance would be
allowed is: min1≤k≤m{
∑k
j=1 R
h
j }. The amount of cash an agent needs in order to prevent
this trade deﬁcit from occurring is therefore
Mh = − min
1≤k≤m
{
k∑
j=1
Rhj }. (8)
The term Mh can be interpreted as the equilibrium demand for real balances, which
is simply the demand for money. This gives us the necessary condition for deﬁning a
cash-in-advance equilibrium.
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Definition 2 (Cash-in-advance equilibrium) A cash-in-advance equilibrium consists of
a positive money stock M¯ > 0, a distribution of money holdings {M1, ...,MN}, an
allocation x and a price system p, such that:
1. (x,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium;
2. Mh = −min1≤k≤m{
∑k
j=1 R
h
j };
3.
∑
hM
h = M¯ .
The cash-in-advance equilibrium (henceforth CIA equilibrium) has two properties that are
important to mention. The ﬁrst property is that the sequence of equilibrium transactions
can be carried out without any agent having a debt along the way, since the equilibrium
money holdingsMh are precisely suﬃcient to prevent any debts from occurring. A second
property of the CIA equilibrium is that the cash-in-advance constraint is never strictly
binding. It can be ‘just binding’, which means that relaxing it would not lead to a change
in the optimum. In a Walrasian equilibrium, which is a special case of a CIA eqm., the
CIA constraint is non-binding.
2.6 Decision-making
We assume that agents are myopic moving-horizon decision-makers. By a moving-horizon
optimization we will understand the following. Although the agents in our model are
inﬁnitely lived they do not plan further ahead than one ‘trading week’, i.e. one period.
This means that the agents have to re-optimize and revise their trading plans during the
trading period. A similar procedure was introduced in Weddepohl (1996), where a ‘gliding’
optimization procedure allows the agents to optimize along a ‘gliding time horizon’.3
3The concept of moving-horizon optimization that will be used here is in order to describe the behavior
of the agents. In control theory this optimization technique is known as ‘closed-loop feedback control’. It
has a long history in the literature on dynamic programming, dating back at least to the late 1950s and
early 1960s, when it was explicitly used to solve inﬁnite horizon optimal control problems. For example
in the state-space optimal control methods used by Bellman and others, Bellman’s principle of optimality
involves the sequential updating of the optimal control as a new state is realized. Furthermore, the
method of closed-loop feedback control often uses a ‘moving window’ or ‘moving horizon’ of ﬁxed length
instead of an inﬁnite horizon to solve the inﬁnite horizon problem. But note that the concept of moving
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At the beginning of a market day an L-dimensional problem is solved based on the
current state and the forecasted data for the next market days. Only the transactions for
the current market are made. On the next market day, the state is again observed and the
forecasts for the future market days are updated. A new L-dimensional problem is solved
at the beginning of every market day, and the transactions for the current market are
made. This procedure is repeated on every market day, hence the term moving horizon.
The state of the economy is updated after every market visit and the agents’ planning
horizon is one ‘trading week’. The essential aspect of the moving-horizon approach is that
the planning horizon has a ﬁxed length and is ‘rolled over’ after every subperiod. Such
a procedure can also be described as ‘solving an online optimization at every step’, since
the problem state in the optimization problem changes over time and the problem has to
be re-solved ‘online’ during the process.
2.6.1 Moving horizon optimization
We assume that consumers maximize utility over a single period (one round of mar-
ket visits) and have no intertemporal preferences. At every subperiod (t, k) the agents’
utility ranges over a single commodity bundle and money is not included in the utility
function. The extension to multiple periods with intertemporal preferences over mul-
tiple commodity bundles (multiple rounds of trade) is straightforward, but only pos-
sible when the intertemporal utility function is time-additive: Uh(uh1 , ..., u
h
T ) =
∑
t u
h
t .
This strong requirement is necessary in order to ensure that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between any two commodities in two consecutive periods is time-invariant:
MRS(xi,t, xj,t+1) = MRS(xi,t+1, xj,t+2), where MRS(x, y) = (∂U/∂x)/(∂U/∂y). This
rules out utility functions that are based on time-discounting, which would introduce a
horizon optimization is being used here in a diﬀerent context. Here we use it as a behavioral postulate
which states that, although agents are inﬁnitely lived in relation to their planning horizon, they are
myopic moving-horizon optimizers who only look one period ahead. Therefore they have to re-optimize
after every sequential step of the process. This is somewhat similar to the closed-loop feedback control
method, but diﬀerent in the sense that in our model the agents do not try to solve an inﬁnite horizon
problem by means of optimal control theory. Furthermore there are multiple agents, which makes the
problem an N -agent optimal control problem. Whether or not the aggregate behavior of all the agents
together leads to the solution of some inﬁnite horizon problem is a diﬀerent matter altogether which does
not concern us here.
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time-inconsistency in the moving-horizon decision-making procedure.
The optimization problem for subperiod (t, k) is:
max
z
{Uh(zh +wh)|p(t, k) · zh(t, k) ≤ M˜h(t, k), zhk (t, k) + whk ≥ 0}. (9)
The consumption plan zh(t, k) made at subperiod (t, k) ranges over the future sequence of
subperiods: T+k = {(t, k), ..., (t,m)}∪{(t+1, 1), ..., (t+1, k−1)}. The new plan zh(t, k+1),
which is made at the start of market k + 1, ranges over the shifted horizon T+k+1. Table 2
depicts the structure of the re-optimization process with the moving planning horizon.
Table 2: 1-period moving-horizon planning.
Planning date (t, 1) (t, 2) (t, 3) (t + 1, 1) (t + 1, 2) (t + 1, 3) (t + 2, 1) (t + 2, 2) (t + 2, 3)
Market 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
(t, 1) X O O
(t, 2) X O O
(t, 3) X O O
(t + 1, 1) X O O
(t + 1, 2) X O O
(t + 1, 3) X O O
X=realized trades, O=planned trades. Moving-horizon planning scheme with a re-optimization
after every subperiod. The planning horizon is one period, so there are no intertemporal transfers
of purchasing power.
2.6.2 Utility specification
We assume that all agents have a CES utility function of the following form:
Uh(x) =
(∑m
k=1 α
h
k(x
h
k)
ν
)1/ν
, ν ∈ (−∞, 1]
=
(∑m
k=1 α
h
k(x
h
k)
(ε−1)/ε)ε/(ε−1) , ε ∈ [0,+∞). (10)
The parameter ν is the substitution parameter, which is considered to be the same for all
agents. The (constant) elasticity of substitution is derived from the substitution parameter
by ε = 1/(1−ν). The notional demand function resulting from utility maximization is such
that agent h plans to spent a fraction of the real wealth (p ·wh + M˜h)/pk on commodity
k. This fraction is a function of the prices, the preference parameters αh = (αh1 , ..., α
h
m),
αhk ≥ 0 and the elasticity parameter ε:
xhk = D
h
k(p; M˜
h, αh, ε) =
(
pk(α
h
k/pk)
ε∑m
k=1 pk(α
h
k/pk)
ε
)
·
(
p ·wh + M˜h
pk
)
. (11)
The parameter ν is used as a bifurcation parameter in the stability analysis. It lies in
the interval ν ∈ (−∞, 1], where ν → −∞ corresponds to Leontief utility (no substitutes,
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ε = 0), ν = 0 corresponds to Cobb-Douglas utility (unitary substitutes, ε = 1), and ν = 1
corresponds to a linear utility function (perfect substitutes, ε = +∞). The default values
for the parameters (α,wh, ν) will be speciﬁed when they become relevant for simulations.
2.7 Budget updating in the cash model
In this section we describe how the budget constraint is updated by the term M˜h. In
a disequilibrium model with inﬁnitely lived agents wealth eﬀects play an important role
since trade takes place outside equilibrium and therefore debt and claims accumulate
over time. The repayment of debts then becomes relevant, so an updating procedure for
the budget constraints is needed. The frequency at which the re-enforcement of debt
repayment is performed can have a large impact on the dynamics, since there are nominal
and real wealth eﬀects for the individual traders. In this section we will show how agents
sequentially update their budget constraints to take into account the debts and claims.
The balance of account of agent h at the beginning of subperiod (t, 1) is denoted by
Mh(t, 1). It can be positive or negative, depending on whether the agent has a debt or
a claim on other agents. The balance of account is the sum of net revenues up to and
including the last transaction during the previous market visit. After every transaction
the realized balance of account is updated:
Mh(t+ n, k) = Mh(t+ n, k − 1) +Rh(t+ n, k − 1) ∀k = 1 (12)
Mh(t+ n+ 1, 1) = Mh(t+ n,m) +Rh(t+ n,m) k = 1. (13)
Here Rh(t, k) = −pk(t, k)z¯hk (t, k) is the money value of the transaction z¯hk . Subperiod
(t+ n,m) is the last subperiod of round n, just before subperiod (t+ n+1, 1). Note that
the balance of account Mh(t, k), for k = 1, is determined at the beginning of subperiod
(t, k) and can therefore only include the receipts and expenditures up to and including
the last transaction of subperiod (t, k − 1).
The sequential market structure makes it necessary to distinguish between the realized
balance of account Mh and the unanticipated debts and claims M˜h. This last term is
used by the agents as a ’rule of thumb’ in the decision-making process, in correction
on the budget constraint. The actual balance of account Mh will ﬂuctuate due to the
time-lag between income and consumption (this is due to the sequential structure of the
economy). Because of these ﬂuctuations we have to ﬁnd a more sophisticated way to
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update the planned balance of account, by taking into account that the transactions are
occurring sequentially and outside of equilibrium. This procedure has to be consistent
with a steady state, since in a CIA equilibrium the sequence of equilibrium transactions
causes ﬂuctuations in the actual balance of account Mh. Therefore we can not simply put
the money balance on the right-hand side of the budget constraint because then it would
not remain constant in a CIA equilibrium. What does remain constant is the change
in the cash positions along the trading sequence. At every point along the equilibrium
sequence the same cash positions are repeated. Also the minimum (and maximum) cash
position computed over the entire sequence is the same in every trading round. Therefore
the actual cash balance Mh can be replaced by the minimum cash position computed
over a full trading round. The model now contains the following additional concepts.
The minimum cash position over the previous round, computed at the start of a new
trading round (t, 1), is given by:
µh(t, 1) = min{Mh(t− 1, 1), ...,Mh(t− 1,m)}. (14)
The minimum cash position over the previous round, computed at the start of every
subperiod (t, k), is given by:
µh(t, k) = min{Mh(t− 1, k), ...,Mh(t− 1,m),Mh(t, 1), ...,Mh(t, k − 1)} (15)
In general, we write pwh + µh for the corrected budget constraint and for the individual
excess demands we write
zh(p, µh) = Dh(p,pwh + µh)−wh. (16)
The planned trade vectors are zh(p(t, k), µh(t, k)) and at subperiod (t, k) they automati-
cally satisfy the budget constraint, since all commodities are included in the optimization
problem. By including µh on the RHS the budget constraint is corrected for any positive
cash balance that arises due to a trade surplus. Such a positive cash balance arises if an
agent ﬁrst sells some of its endowments and then turns out to be demand-rationed later
on. The resulting trade surplus can then be spend immediately on consumption during
the next market visit.
In a CIA equilibrium µh = 0 and zh(p, 0) = zh(p). This trading plan is consistent
in the sense that agents do not plan to violate their budget constraint, so agents are
not planning to make a surplus but the positive cash balances are unanticipated (and
unintentional).
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2.8 Proportional quantity rationing mechanism
This section describes the market rationing mechanism. Rationing of demand or supply
is required if the trading plans zh are incompatible, in the sense that for some markets
demand is not equal to supply, i.e.
∑
h z
h
k = 0. Consequently, a system of quantity
rationing assignments is needed in order for transactions to occur outside of equilibrium.
The mechanism by which agents are rationed depends on the market structure, and can
be heterogeneous for diﬀerent markets. For the setup of the disequilibrium framework we
follow Be´nassy (1974). An agent is rationed if and only if the individual excess demand
is on the ‘long side’ of the market, that is if it has the same sign as the aggregate excess
market demand: zhk ·
∑
h z
h
k > 0. For proportional rationing this mechanism is described by
a map Fhk that maps individual excess demands (z
h
k ) to assignments of rationed demands
(z¯hk ) as follows:
z¯hk = F
h
k(z
1
k, ..., z
N
k ), such that
∑
h
z¯hk = 0. (17)
We assume that Fhk = F for all h, k, where:
1. if Dk ≥ Sk then (Dk/Sk) ≥ 1 and
z¯hk =

 (Sk/Dk)z
h
k for z
h
k ≥ 0
zhk for z
h
k ≤ 0
(18)
2. if Dk ≤ Sk then (Dk/Sk) ≤ 1 and
z¯hk =

 z
h
k for z
h
k ≥ 0
(Dk/Sk)z
h
k for z
h
k ≤ 0.
(19)
The transactions that are realized on market k are by deﬁnition equal to the rationed
demand and supplies z¯hk on market k. Note that the rationing function is only a function
of the excess demands on market k. The function Fhk can be market speciﬁc, and it can
also discriminate among the agents if it is made heterogeneous across the agents and/or
the markets.
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2.9 Price dynamics
2.9.1 Sequential price dynamics
In the sequential trading process the price adjustments are taking place sequentially,
instead of simultaneously for all markets at once. Let fk denote some price adjustment
function for the price on market k, which must be necessarily a function of the entire
price vector since the agents’ trading plans are a function of all prices. Recall that the
price-vector p(t, 1) is given at the start of subperiod (t, 1), and the price for market 1 is
updated after market 1 has been visited, but before market 2 opens. Therefore, p1(t, 2) =
f1(p(t, 1)). The price dynamics in the sequential model therefore evolves according to:
p(t, 1) = (p1(t, 1), p2(t, 1), ..., pm(t, 1))
p(t, 2) = (f1(p(t, 1)), p2(t, 1), ..., pm(t, 1))
p(t, 3) = (f1(p(t, 1)), f2(p(t, 2)), p3(t, 1), ..., pm(t, 1))
...
p(t, k + 1) = (f1(p(t, 1)), f2(p(t, 2)), ..., fk(p(t, k)), pk+1(t, 1), ..., pm(t, 1))
...
p(t+ 1, 1) = (f1(p(t, 1)), f2(p(t, 2)), ..., fm(p(t,m− 1))).
(20)
It is clear that this system is not yet written in closed-form, but it can be turned into
a simultaneous system of diﬀerence equations by substituting the ﬁrst equation into the
second, the ﬁrst and second into the third, etc. This does not alter the dimension of the
system, which remains m-dimensional.
2.9.2 Proportional price adjustments
We will use a proportional price adjustment rule that is based on the ratio of aggregate
market demand and aggregate market supply. We assume that the price mechanism is
the same on all markets: fk = f :
4
pk(t+ 1, k) = fk(p(t, k)) ≡ pk(t, k)
(
Dk(p(t, k))
Sk(p(t, k))
)λk
. (21)
This price rule has the property that: pk(t + 1, k) = pk(t, k) if and only if Dk = Sk, for
all λk. Hence in an equilibrium the prices do not change. The parameter λ is the ‘speed
4This proportional price rule can also be derived from the ratio of excess demand over total market
supply: pk,t+1 = pk,t(1 + zk/Sk) = pk(1 + (Dk − Sk)/Sk) = pk(Dk/Sk).
17
of adjustment’ parameter, which plays a crucial role for the stability of the price process.
It can be interpreted as the price flexibility. High values of λ indicate that prices are
very ﬂexible; low values of λ indicate that prices are rigid; λ = 0 means that prices are
completely ﬁxed. We assume that the price ﬂexibility is the same on all markets: λk = λ.
The price ﬂexibility can be assumed to be homogeneous across markets without loss of
generality, by a rescaling of the units in which the quantities of commodities are measured.
Since a priori there are no theoretical arguments for the value of the parameter λ, we will
use it as a bifurcation parameter to investigate the stability of the dynamics with respect
to changes in the price ﬂexibility.
Another nice property of the DS-ratio rule is that it can be transformed into a log-
transformation of the classical discrete-time version of the tatonnement process that is
often used in the literature: [pk(t + 1) − pk(t)]/pk(t) = λzk(t). Taking the logarithm on
both sides of the DS-rule, we obtain
log(pk(t+ 1))− log(pk(t)) = λ · (log(Dk)− log(Sk)), (22)
which is linear in both log-demand and log-supply.
2.9.3 Price normalization
Since nominal price levels are indeterminate, we normalize prices using a simplex-normalization
rule. The real-balance eﬀect (the eﬀect that old debts denominated in the old currency
become cheaper in terms of purchasing power when the price level increases) should not
aﬀect the agents’ demand for commodities, since the demand functions are homogeneous.
The purchasing power of the old balance of account should remain constant in real terms
if all prices are normalized by the normalization rule. Therefore we will also have to
re-normalize all the cash balances by the same normalization rule.
The budget constraint after normalization, i.e., the real wealth consisting of (i) the
value of possessions pwh and (ii) the initial real balances Mh, is given by:
p · xh
N(p)/c
≤ p ·w
h
N(p)/c
+
Mh
N(p)/c
, where N(p) =
m∑
i=1
pi. (23)
The last term is the normalization of the real balance of account. In simulations we
have used the normalization rule
∑
pi = 3, since all the examples we consider have three
markets, hence c ≡ m = 3. The normalization is performed after every change in the
price-vector, i.e. after every sequential market visit.
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2.9.4 Price growth restrictions
We introduce price rigidities in the form of ‘ceilings’ and ‘ﬂoors’ on the growth rates of
prices. This is to prevent the nominal prices from imploding or exploding, and in order to
keep the ﬂuctuations of nominal prices bounded within economically meaningful regions.
Let the price growth factor be given by πk(t + 1) ≡ pk(t + 1)/pk(t). We deﬁne limits to
growth by π+k = (1 + r
+) and π−k = (1− r−), where r+ and r− are the maximum rates of
upward and downward growth, respectively. The upward and downward price rigidities
are given by the following restrictions:
π−k ≤ πk(tk + 1) ≤ π+k , (1− r−) ≤
pk(tk + 1)
pk(tk)
≤ (1 + r+). (24)
In terms of the growth rates of the log-prices, the price rigidities are linear restrictions
and the following are equivalent:
log π−k ≤ log πk(t+ 1) ≤ log π+k
log(1− r−) ≤ (log pk(t+ 1)− log pk(t)) ≤ log(1 + r+)
−r− ≤ log pk(t+ 1)− log pk(t) ≤ r+.
(25)
The last line follows since log(1+x) = x in ﬁrst approximation. For the proportional price
rule in (21) the price changes are restricted by the growth rates π+k and π
−
k as follows:
πk = min{π+k ,max{π−k , (D/S)λ}}. (26)
Redeﬁning the restrictions to take the parameter λ into account we obtain new bounds:
η− = (−r−/λ) and η+ = (r+/λ). The log-price changes are now restricted by the log-
growth rates η− and η+ (note that λ no longer appears in the restrictions due to the
re-parametrization):
log
pk(tk + 1)
pk(tk)
=


λ log(D/S), if η− ≤ log(D/S) ≤ η+
−r−, if log(D/S) ≤ η−
r+, if log(D/S) ≥ η+.
(27)
The terms η− and η+ simultaneously take into account the eﬀect of the price adjustment
speed λ and the restrictions r+ and r− respectively, and can be interpreted as the minimum
and maximum growth rate in log-prices.
Model parameters
All parameters and their simulation speciﬁcations are given in Table 3.
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Table 3: Model parameters.
Parameter label range
preferences αhk {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
substitution parameter ν (−∞, 1)
elasticity of substitution ε (0,+∞), ε = 1/(1− ν)
price ﬂexibility λ [0, 2]
maximum price growth rates r−, r+ r− = 0.09, r+ = 0.10
downward price rigidity π− π− = (1− r−) = 0.91
upward price rigidity π+ π+ = (1 + r+) = 1.10
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3 Simulation
Having described the details of all the model elements we can now formulate the dynamical
system. Figure 2 provides a ﬂowchart for the sequence of events that takes place during a
single market visit. Figure 3 gives a pseudo-code or algorithm which encodes these events
into a computational model.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Given are the initial conditions: p(0) is random, µh1(0) = 0, M
h
1 (0) = 100. The fol-
lowing steps are performed for every agent h = 1, .., N during market visit k in subperiod
(t, k), for k = 1, ...,m and t = 0, ..., T (see Figure 3):
1. Determine the desired trades zhk (t, k) for market k given the notional excess demand
function zh(p(t, k), µh(t, k)) (eqn. 3, speciﬁed in eqn. 11).
2. Apply the cash-in-advance constraint to the buy and sell orders (eqn. 6).
3. Determine the transactions z¯hk (t, k) on market k (the rationed demand and supply),
by the function F (eqn. 17).
4. Determine the net revenues Rhk(t, k) from trading on market k and update the cash
balance Mh(t, k) (eqn. 13).
5. Update the minimum cash position over the current round µhk(t, k) (eqn. 15).
6. Update the price pk(t+ 1, k) for market k (eqn. 21).
In step 4 we have to collect a history of previous cash balances for each individual agent:
{Mhk+1, ...,Mhm,Mh1 , ...,Mhk }. This is necessary in order to calculate the agents’ minimum
cash position over one complete past round of trades. The sequence {Mhk+1, ...,Mhm} comes
from the previous round, whereas the sequence {Mh1 , ...,Mhk } comes from the current
round.5
5It is possible to simulate a weak form of the cash-in-advance model by leaving out step 2 from the
simulations. This removes the ‘hard’ cash-in-advance constraint, but there is still the correction on the
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3.1 Example: CES utility
We consider an example with N = 3 agents and m = 3 commodities (markets). On every
market there are two sellers and one buyer (a case of monopsony). The agents all have
CES utility functions with preferences and endowments speciﬁed as follows:
Ua(xa) = [0.2(xa1)
ν + 0.4(xa2)
ν + 0.4(xa3)
ν ]1/ν , wa = (50, 0, 50),Ma(0) = 100,
U b(xb) = [0.4(xb1)
ν + 0.2(xb2)
ν + 0.4(xb3)
ν ]1/ν , wb = (50, 50, 0),M b(0) = 100,
U c(xc) = [0.4(xc1)
ν + 0.4(xc2)
ν + 0.2(xc3)
ν ]1/ν , wc = (0, 50, 50),M c(0) = 100.
(28)
The preferences and endowments are such that every agent owns two commodities and
strictly prefers one of these two. The agent is indiﬀerent between the commodity that he
does not own and the strictly preferred commodity that he does own. This implies that the
agent is willing to part with some quantity of the least preferred commodity, in exchange
for the strictly preferred commodities. With Cobb-Douglas preferences (ν = 0, ε = 1) the
planned consumption and the notional excess demands are given by (equilibrium income
is p ·wh = 100):
x =


20 40 40
40 20 40
40 40 20

 , z =


−30 40 −10
−10 −30 40
40 −10 −30

 .
3.2 Fluctuations in the balance of account in equilibrium
For the example given above, the equilibrium price system is p = (θ, θ, θ), θ ∈ R+. To
every arbitrary positive money stock M¯ > 0 there corresponds a price level θ which
can be determined by the quantity equation M¯ = 50θ. The number 50 is coincidental
for this choice of preference parameters. In addition, the presence of money turns the
indeterminate Walrasian equilibrium into a determinate CIA equilibrium (see def. 2).
The money stock acts as a numeraire and the price levels adjust to the CIA equilibrium
that is associated to the money stock M¯ . The initial money holdings of every agent are
budget constraint by the minimum cash position µh. This would imply that we allow for debts to occur
again (a negative balance of account), but the largest trade deﬁcit is still used as a correction mechanism
on the budget constraint. This correction mechanism can be said to act as a “soft” cash-in-advance
constraint, since it is driving the dynamics towards a CIA equilibrium without strictly constraining the
consumption pattern. The diﬀerence with the current model in which we do put restrictions on the
consumption pattern is subtle, and we have not investigated this matter any further.
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set toMh(0) = 100, as an initial condition. This ﬁxes the money stock at M¯ = 300. For a
substitution parameter ν = 0 (the Cobb-Douglas case) the equilibrium cash distribution is
then given by: M1 = 60,M2 = 0,M3 = 240. The equilibrium price system associated
to the CIA equilibrium is p = (6, 6, 6). This is a result of the fact that if prices were
p = (1, 1, 1) then agents’ cash requirements are
∑
hM
h = 50. Since we have imposed
M¯ = 300, the price level is now θ = 6. In the CIA equilibrium the sequence of transactions
in monetary terms is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Equilibrium demand for money balances.
Agent 1 2 3
Mh(t, 1) 60 0 240 Start of market round: initial money holdings.
Mh(t, 2) 240 60 0 Agent 1 receives 180, agent 2 receives 60 (both from agent 3).
Mh(t, 3) 0 240 60 Agent 2 receives 180, agent 3 receives 60 (both from agent 1).
Mh(t, 1) 60 0 240 Agent 3 receives 180, agent 1 receives 60 (both from agent 2).
The total amount of cash that is required for the transactions to occur at any time is the
row sum 300. The money stock that supports a CIA equilibrium is therefore given by M¯ =
300. But given any other value of M¯ , the money stock will be automatically redistributed
among the agent population. The cash distribution {Mh}h in a CIA equilibrium with
a diﬀerent money stock M¯ depends on the proportional change in the money stock: if
M¯ → βM¯ then (p1, ..., pm)→ (βp1, ..., βpm).
At the start all cash is concentrated with agents 1 and 3. Agent 2 does not need any
cash at the start of market 1 since he is a seller on markets 1 and 2, and a buyer on
market 3. Agent 1 needs some cash to be able to buy on market 2 and agent 3 needs cash
to buy on market 1. Agent 3 requires the most cash, since he will be buying commodity
1 from both agents 1 and 2 before he can sell commodity 2 to agent 1 and commodity 3
to agent 2. This reasoning holds from the perspective of starting on market 1. If we start
the equilibrium sequence on market 2 then the cash requirements are rotated cyclically,
as shown by the sequence of payments in Table 4.
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3.3 Fluctuations in the balance of account out of equilibrium
We start by analyzing the model from the time series perspective. Below we show three
examples of the dynamics:
1. The transition path towards a stable CIA equilibrium (ν = −0.1).
2. Fluctuations around an unstable CIA equilibrium for low elasticity of substitution
(ν = 0).
3. Fluctuations around an unstable CIA equilibrium for high elasticity of substitution
(ν = 0.4).
The transition path towards a stable CIA equilibrium
In Figure 4 we show time series of the individual cash balances for each agent. The plot
shows the entire transition path, starting from an initial cash distribution {M1(0),M2(0),M3(0)} =
{100, 100, 100}. The variables M1(t, 1), M2(t, 1), M3(t, 1) represent the cash balance of
each agent at the start of every round (beginning of market 1), for 50 consecutive trading
rounds (0 < n < 50). For the substitution parameter ν = −0.1 the CIA equilibrium is
asymptotically stable under the speciﬁed proportional price dynamics, and each agents’
time series converges to its CIA-equilibrium value as shown in Table 4. The equilibrium
values corresponding to the substitution parameter ν = −0.1 are slightly shifted from
the equilibrium values at ν = 0 in the table. For agent 1 the equilibrium cash balance is
therefore slightly above 60 and for agent 3 it is slightly below 240: M1 = 62, M2 = 0
and M3 = 238.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Fluctuations around an unstable CIA equilibrium (low elasticity case)
In Figure 5 we show the typical dynamical behavior for the case of a CIA equilibrium
that is unstable. The ﬁgure shows time series plots of the cash balances at the start of
every market visit, for 450 consecutive trading rounds (50 < n < 500). For Cobb-Douglas
utility (ν = 0) the CIA equilibrium is locally unstable. The behavior can be characterized
as quasi-periodic, since it never repeats exactly in the same pattern.
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A more detailed description of the dynamics outside of equilibrium is as follows.
- Every agent has two trading posts: there are two markets on which an agent wants
to sell his endowments.
- Agent 1 is sometimes restricted by his cash constraint on market 2, since he is a
buyer on market 2 and a seller on markets 1 and 3. If agent 1 was supply-constrained
on market 1 then he will ﬁnd himself short of cash and unable to consume on market
2. The cash constraint therefore becomes binding during his visit to market 2, just
before entering market 3 on which he plans to sell again. At the start of market 3
the cash balance of agent 1 thus reaches the zero level in equilibrium (see plot (1,3)
in ﬁg. 5). At the start of market 1, the cash balance ﬂuctuates around 60 (see plot
(1,1)), and at the start of market 2 it ﬂuctuates around 240 (see plot (1,2)). The
equilibrium sequence for agent 1 is: (60, 240, 0).
- Agent 2 wants to sell on markets 1 and 2 and buy on market 3. Therefore a cash
constraint becomes binding during his visit to market 3, just before visiting market 1
on which he plans to sell. The cash balance will reach the zero level (in equilibrium)
just after having visited market 3, and before market 1 opens for trade (see plot
(2,1) in ﬁg. 5). At the start of market 2 the cash balance ﬂuctuates around 60
(plot (2,2)), and at the start of market 3 around 240 (plot (2,3)). The equilibrium
sequence for agent 2 is: (0, 60, 240).
- Agent 3 is a seller on markets 2 and 3, and a buyer on market 1. He is sometimes
rationed by his cash constraint on market 1. Therefore we see that his cash balance
reaches the zero level (in equilibrium) at the beginning of market 2 (see plot (3,2)).
At the start of market 3 the cash balance ﬂuctuates around 60 (see plot (3,3)), and
at the start of market 1 around 240 (see plot (3,1)). The equilibrium sequence for
agent 3 is: (240, 0, 60).
A general observation is that for each agent the cash-in-advance constraint becomes bind-
ing on the market that is entered just before one of the own trading posts is visited. This
means that in equilibrium each agent spents its entire cash holdings just before the agent
earns an income by selling some of his endowments again.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
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Fluctuations around an unstable CIA equilibrium (high elasticity case)
In Figure 6 we show what happens for higher values of the substitution parameter ν =
0.4 (this corresponds to an elasticity of substitution ε = 1/(1 − 0.4) = 1.66). The
corresponding equilibrium cash distribution has shifted from {Mh(t, 1)}h = (60, 0, 240)
to {Mh(t, 1)}h = (40.8, 0, 259.2). The phase plots in Figure 6 show that the cash-in-
advance constraint becomes binding more often in case of a higher elasticity of substitution
(higher parameters ν and ε). This is due to the higher sensitivity of the demand to price
ﬂuctuations.
Note that if the cash constraint becomes binding, then the ﬂuctuations in the cash
balance remain inside a bounding box in the phase space. This bounded movement seems
to be a result of the fact that there is only one buyer per market: the maximum cash
position of a seller on a particular market is restricted by the cash constraint of the single
buyer on that market. The only way that a seller can obtain a higher income (i.e. reach
points that lie outside of the bounding box) is when the buyer is not cash-constrained.
A secondary eﬀect is that the prices bounce back and forth between the price bound-
aries. This is what we observe in the phase plots in terms of prices in Figure 7. There
are upward and downward restrictions on the price growth rates, but not on the absolute
levels. These price rigidities are restricting the price-feasibility region: there is a maxi-
mum positive growth rate of 10% and a maximum negative growth rate of 9%. The eﬀect
of these price rigidities is that the minimum cash position of the agents now ﬂuctuates
between 0 and 20, as shown in the time series of the cash balances in Figure 6, subplot
(1,1).
In conclusion, two rather diﬀerent types of restrictions play a role if the elasticity of
substitution is increased: there is the cash-in-advance constraint which becomes binding
more often and there are the price rigidities that become more restrictive. These restric-
tions are strongly related: if the price ﬂuctuations become more erratic (by an increased
price-elasticity of the demand for commodities) then also the income of the agents will
ﬂuctuate more violently and so will the cash balances. The ﬂuctuations in the cash bal-
ances in turn aﬀect the agents demand and supply decisions, which causes ﬂuctuations in
the excess demands. These excess demand ﬂuctuations then feed back into the dynamics
of the price ﬂuctuations.
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[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
3.4 Stability analysis
Figure 8 shows a 2-parameter bifurcation diagram for the elasticity of substitution pa-
rameter 0 < ν < 0.9 and the price ﬂexibility parameter 0 < λ < 2. It illustrates some
high-order periodic cycles that can occur in the model for diﬀerent parameter combina-
tions. Cycles of periodicity {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 19} are shown to occur. Figure 9
shows a particular bifurcation scenario for the ﬁxed parameter value λ = 0.5 and varying
ν between ν = 0.67 and ν = 0.69.
As far as it can be determined by numerical methods, the bifurcation scenario that
occurs in Figure 9a-f is a subcritical Hopf bifurcation of a steady state, followed by a
saddle-node bifurcation, followed by a secondary Hopf bifurcation.
First the stable steady state becomes unstable through the subcritical Hopf bifurcation
producing a sudden transition to a large invariant circle (Figure 9a). At the moment
of bifurcation also an unstable invariant circle is created, but because the bifurcation
is subcritical there is a jump from the steady state to the stable branch of the invariant
circle. This invariant circle then undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation producing a periodic
sink and a periodic saddle of period-11 (Figure 9b). The period-11 cycle loses stability
through a secondary Hopf bifurcation which generates an attractor like the one shown
in Figure 9c. This attractor consists of 11 quasi-periodic cycles around each of the 11
saddle-sink pairs. An 11-piece attractor emerges (Figure 9d) in which the 11 pieces are
being visited cyclically. The dynamics along this 11-cyclic attractor undergoes phase-
locking which turns the attractor into a stable period-11 cycle (Figure 9e). The unstable
invariant circle in Figure 9b undergoes a period-doubling bifurcation, transforming it into
a ﬁgure-eight shape. Figure 9f shows this ﬁgure-eight shape just after the period-doubling
of the (repelling) invariant circle has taken place.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
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4 Conclusions
We have described in relative detail a model with disequilibrium trade and cash-in-advance
constraints. There is quantity-rationing to clear the markets and transactions take place
sequentially. Agents’ cash balances are tracked over time by keeping account of the debts
and claims they make outside of equilibrium.
We have used the cash-in-advance (Clower) constraint which leads to an alternative
equilibrium concept, namely that the sequence of payments along the trading round re-
mains the same and money has to be used for all transactions. The CIA equilibrium
retains all the properties of a general equilibrium (it is a Walrasian equilibrium) except
that it is no longer indeterminate since there is a positive money stock.
According to Magill and Quinzii (1996, Ch.7) a satisfactory modelling of money re-
quires an open-ended future. Trade should take place in a sequence economy in which the
imperfections in the trading opportunities of the agents play a role. Although the model
presented here has a ﬁnite planning horizon instead of an inﬁnite horizon, nonetheless
the future is open-ended because agents are myopic: they only plan ahead one trading
round which consists of multiple market visits. Due to the trade at disequilibrium prices
and the spill-over eﬀects from quantity rationing agents have to revise their trading plans
subject to new information that arrives during the trading round. Such a moving-horizon
time-structure results in a genuinely dynamic monetary model of an exchange economy
with trade outside equilibrium.
The cash-in-advance constraint acts as a ”hard” correction mechanism on ﬂuctuations
in the balance of account because the agents are not allowed to enter into credit arrange-
ments. In combination with the corrections on the budget constraint the cash-in-advance
constraint drives the economy back towards an equilibrium if the disequilibrium becomes
too large. Due to the fact that agents are not allowed to make any debts along the adjust-
ment path the cash-in-advance constraint causes the agents to become demand-rationed.
The constraint does not help to dampen the amplitude of fluctuations or to prevent cycles
from occurring because the correction mechanism can overshoot. When this occurs there
are large swings in the prices which will directly inﬂuence the cash balances as well, since
the transactions have to be paid at the ﬂuctuating price levels. These ﬂuctuations are
then exacerbated by the cash-in-advance constraint rather than dampened.
The ﬂuctuations in the cash balances increase with the elasticity of substitution due to
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the higher sensitivity of the demand to price ﬂuctuations. If the cash-in-advance process
converges to a neighborhood of the cash-in-advance equilibrium then the process shows
small ﬂuctuations around the steady state before it converges and the convergence takes
place without the occurrence of debts and claims along the adjustment path. However,
for large values of the substitution parameter ν, the process may not converge to a steady
state but to periodic or quasi-periodic orbits.
For the dynamics to be stable it seems necessary that the correction mechanism is not
updating too fast, since this may exacerbate the ﬂuctuations in the balance of account.
This hints at a more general conjecture that the market mechanisms and the market
structure are perhaps of greater importance than whether or not the agents in the model
are in fact using optimal trading strategies that take into account all of the relevant market
information. The main message of our simulation exercise is that even if agents take the
relevant market signals into account, and update their budget constraints sequentially,
the occurrence of erratic dynamics cannot be dismissed by introducing more sophisticated
correction mechanisms.
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Figure 1: Sequential market visits. Markets are considered as ‘trading posts’ that are
being visited sequentially. The bank is central to all exchanges, since commodities can
only be exchanged against money (barter is excluded).
Figure 2: Flow diagram of market events. The diagram shows the sequence of events that
occurs during a single market visit. The sequence is repeated for all markets k = 1, ...,m,
after which the next trading round begins.
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Cash-in-advance process.
Initial conditions: p(0), µh1(0) = 0,M
h
1 (0) = 100.
For Round t = 0, ..., T do
For Market k = 1, ...,m do
1. zhk := z
h
k(p, µ
h
k)
dhk := max{0, zhk}, Dk :=
∑
h d
h
k,
shk := min{0, zhk}, Sk := −
∑
h s
h
k
2. zˆhk := min{zhk ,Mh/pk}
3. z¯hk := F
h
k(zˆ
1
k, ..., zˆ
N
k )
4. Rh(t, k) := −pk(t, k)z¯hk (t, k)
Mh(t, k + 1) := Mh(t, k) +Rh(t, k),
5. µh(t, k + 1) := min{Mh(t, 1), ...,Mh(t, k + 1),Mh(t− 1, k + 2), ...,Mh(t− 1,m)}
6. pk(t+ 1, k) := max{(1− r−) · pk(t, k),min{pk(t, k)
(
Dk(t,k)
Sk(t,k)
)λ
, (1 + r+) · pk(t, k)}}
end
end.
Figure 3: Algorithm for the sequential cash-in-advance model.
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Money balances at the start of every trading round (ν = −0.1)
Agent 1: M1(t, 1) Agent 2: M2(t, 1) Agent 3: M3(t, 1)
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Figure 4: Timeseries of individual money balances at the start of every trading round,
for 50 consecutive rounds (0 < n < 50). Parameters: ν = −0.1, λ = 1. The equilibrium
corresponding to the substitution parameter ν = −0.1 is slightly shifted from the equilib-
rium values at ν = 0. For agent 1 the equilibrium cash balance is therefore slightly above
60 and for agent 3 it is slightly below 240: M1 = 62, M2 = 0 and M3 = 238.
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Money balances
(a) Agent 1: M1(t, k)
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Figure 5: Parameters: ν = 0, λ = 1. Money balances at the start of every market visit,
for 450 consecutive rounds (50 < n < 500). Timeseries and phase plots of individual
money balances: M1(t, k), M2(t, k) and M3(t, k), for k = 1, 2, 3. Eqm: p = (6, 6, 6),
M1 = (60, 240, 0),M2 = (0, 60, 240),M3 = (240, 0, 60).
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Figure 6: Parameters: ν = 0.40, λ = 1. Money balances at the start of every mar-
ket visit, for 450 consecutive rounds (50 < n < 500). Timeseries and phase plots
of individual money balances: M1(t, k), M2(t, k) and M3(t, k), for k = 1, 2, 3. Eqm:
p = (6, 6, 6),M1 = (40.8, 259.2, 0),M2 = (0, 40.8, 259.2),M3 = (259.2, 0, 40.8).
Price levels p1(t, k), p2(t, k), p3(t, k)
(a) ν = 0: Low elasticity of substitution.
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(b) ν = 0.4: High elasticity of substitution.
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Figure 7: Parameters: (a) ν = 0, λ = 1 (b) ν = 0.4, λ = 1. Timeseries and phase plots of
price levels: p1(t, 1), p2(t, 2) and p3(t, 3). Prices at the start of every market visit, for 25
consecutive rounds (475 < n < 500).
Bifurcation diagram
Figure 8: A 2-parameter bifurcation diagram in the (λ, ν)-plane, for 0 < λ < 2, 0 < ν < 0.9. λ
is the price ﬂexibility, ν is the substitution parameter.
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Bifurcation scenario
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Figure 9: Phase plots in the price phase-space (p1(t), p1(t + 1)) for ν ∈ [0.67, 0.69], λ = 0.5.
T = 10.000, transient= 1.000. Initial condition: Mh(0) = 100. (a) An invariant circle becomes
unstable and (b) undergoes a period-doubling. (c) An invariant torus is created. (d) The torus
breaks up into an 11-piece attractor. (e) A stable 11-cycle is created due to resonance. (f) The
attractor gets a ﬁgure eight-shape.
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